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Abstract 
A  major  political  and  policy  issue  today  is  whether  globalisation  and  rapid 
economic growth in India and China would have an adverse affect on labour 
markets in the U.S. and other advanced countries. Some leading economists 
have argued that even though the recent integration of India and China with the 
liberalised  global  economy  has  not  so  far  had  a  serious  negative  impact  on 
wages and employment in advanced countries, it is most likely to do so in the 
future in view of the growing technological and scientific capabilities in the two 
developing countries. This is also because it is suggested that this integration 
represents a sudden doubling of the world labour force without a concomitant 
increase  in  capital.  The  present  paper  argues  against  this  plausible  thesis, 
essentially on two grounds: (a) it does not take into account the demand side 
effects of fast growth in India and China; and (b) it abstracts from the dynamism 
of  the  U.S.  real  economy  and  its  innovative  large  corporations.    However, 
simulations  of  different  scenarios  on  the  CAM  world  econometric  model 
indicate that at a disaggregated level there are severe supply side constraints on 
energy,  raw  materials  and  food  which  thwart  the  expansionary  demand  side 
effects of fast growth in India and China.  
 
JEL Classification: J20, J21, F01 
 




The authors are solely responsible for the contents of the paper. It does not in 
any way implicate the institutions to which the authors belong. 
 
This  paper  relies  heavily  on  and  updates  my  previous  contributions  Singh 
(2007a, 2007b).  I am grateful to Professor Rolph van der Hoeven at the ILO in 









Further information about the Centre for Business Research can be found at the 
following address: www.cbr.cam.ac.uk   1
Introduction 
This paper examines the impact on labour markets in advanced countries (ACs) 
of the integration of the two giant fast-growing countries, China and India, with 
the liberalised global economy.  This integration is taking place under ‘current 
globalisation,’  which  consists  of  free-trade,  free  capital  movements  and 
domestic labour market flexibility (instead of free international movement of 
labour). These are, broadly speaking, the ‘rules of the game’ under which the 
world  economy  presently  operates.  In  this  context,  the  paper  gives  special 
attention to the pioneering contribution of Richard Freeman (2005), Professor of 
Economics at Harvard University. Freeman suggests that even if trade with the 
South may previously not have seriously disadvantaged workers from the rich 
countries of the North, the doubling of the global labour force with India and 
China’s  recent  integration  with  the  international  economy  may  nevertheless 
have  profoundly  unfavourable  repercussions  for  Advanced  Countries’  (AC) 
workers.  
 
As this paper is being presented in the U.S. the following paragraph which was 
written for a non-U.S. audience is not needed. (It is nevertheless included in a 
footnote below.) This is because the question being addressed is acknowledged 
to be at the top of the political and policy agenda in this country. Professor 
Freeman, who is one of the most eminent labour economists in the country, has 
made seminal contributions to its discussion and analysis. So it is fitting that 
Professor Freeman’s contributions should be the main focus of this paper.
1  
 
1.  The International Context 
One heartening feature of the evolution of the world economy during the last 
two to three decades has been the outstanding economic success of China and 
India – two of the world’s most populous and hitherto extremely poor countries.  
Starting  out  with  the  world’s  largest  absolute  numbers  of  people  living  in 
poverty, in narrow economic terms the two countries have achieved impressive 
growth.  Graph 1 provides a broad-brush statistical profile of GDP growth over 
the  last  four  decades  for  China,  India,  and  all  medium  and  low-income 
countries, that is for developing countries (DCs), and for the world economy as 
a whole.  
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Graph 1: Trends in Real GDP Growth: China, India, developing 
economies, and the world 1965- 2003 (Average annual percentage growth) 
 
Source: Adapted from Dasgupta and Singh (2005). 
 
China has undoubtedly been the fastest growing country in the world over the 
last quarter of a century, achieving historically unprecedented, almost double-
digit, growth rates since 1980.  Similarly, although not as fast as China, India’s 
economic growth has nevertheless also been one of the highest in the world 
since 1980, its per capita growth rate tripling between 1950-1980 and 1980-
2005 (Kelkar, 2005).  India was among the ten fastest growing countries in the 
world over each of the two decades 1980-1990 and 1990-2000.  This record is 
not  matched  by  any  country  other  than  China.    Indeed,  the  acceleration  of 
growth in India and China in the last quarter century is particularly remarkable, 
as it has taken place at a time of deceleration in world economic growth. Fast 
economic  growth  has  led  to  large-scale  income  poverty  reductions  in  both 
countries, although the extent in the Indian case since 1990 is still debated.  
There have also been huge improvements in human development indicators.  
For recent contributions to this debate see, for example, Sen and Himanshu 
(2004), Srinivasan (2003) and UNDP (2005, Box 1.3).  
 
The rapid economic expansion of these two giants has given rise to serious 
concerns in advanced nations (‘the North’) regarding both the short and the 
long-term implications for their people.  Since the end of the ‘golden age’ of 
fast economic growth in ACs in the mid-1970s, most advanced economies have 
been suffering from serious labour market difficulties. Specifically, workers and   3
trade unions blame competition from low-wage economies such as China and 
India for their problems, including:  
 
￿  Deindustrialization:  while India and China have been expanding their 
industry at a very fast rate and are undergoing industrial revolutions
2, the 
absolute  numbers  employed  in  manufacturing  as  well  as  the  share  of 
manufacturing in employment in ACs has been falling.  
￿  There has been increasing income inequality in many ACs, particularly 
the UK and the US.   This has often been ascribed to stagnant or falling 
real wages of the unskilled workers in the North as a result of competition 
from the low-wage countries of the South, which, moreover, are alleged 
not to obey international labour standards.  
￿  There have been high rates of unemployment particularly in the European 
Union (EU), which are also popularly attributed to competition from the 
South. 
 
In  the  post-World  War  II  period,  the  economics  profession,  as  well  as  the 
traditional liberal establishment in the US have favoured free trade and taken a 
broadly  benign  view  of  the  effects  of  competition  from  poor  countries  on 
economic welfare in the North. This position has been backed up by research.  
Despite  following  different  methodologies,  the  research  indicates  that  the 
effects of globalisation, in particular  of trade between rich and poor countries, 
has had very little impact on employment and wages for workers in advanced 
countries such as the US. The labour market problems of advanced country 
workers  are  attributed  in  this  analysis  much  more  to  the  nature  of  the  new 
technology rather than to globalisation.  However, it is precisely this favourable 
perspective on globalisation which has seriously been challenged by Freeman. 
 
2.  Dangers from New Globalisers for ACs -The Freeman Thesis 
Freeman’s  new  post-1995  line  of  thought,  which  regards  globalisation  as  a 
potentially  major  threat  for  the  North’s  workers,  chimes  in  very  well  with 
popular sentiment in advanced countries (ACs).  Opinion polls indicate 6 out of 
10  citizens  in  the  US  are  not  persuaded  by  the  supposed  benefits  of 
globalisation.  This is quite remarkable in view of the fact that the US economy 
has recorded the strongest growth rate of all major economies in the last 10 
years. Further, it has also been much more stable than ever before (Martin and 
Rowthorn 2005)  However, U.S. wages and salaries have been more volatile 
than before which suggests that the general scepticism about globalisation is 
perhaps not so remarkable after all.  Freeman’s 2005 contribution provides a 
formidable and sophisticated articulation of this sentiment; further, in addition 
to the short term, Freeman is very much concerned with the potential adverse 
long-term effects of global economic integration.  The latter aspect adds to the 
weight of Freeman’s analysis.   4
 
The essential basis for Freeman’s argument is his observation that the global 
labour force has all of a sudden doubled with the entry of India, China and 
former Soviet Block countries into the liberalised global market in the recent 
period.    He  suggests  that  in  1985  there  were  about  a  billion  workers  who 
competed with each other under ‘globalisation’ i.e. these countries by then had 
achieved  more  or  less  free  trade  and  more  or  less  free  capital  movements 
amongst themselves.  This globalised countries group at the time consisted of 
the OECD economies and Latin America.  According to Freeman’s estimate, 
approximately 960 million people worked in these countries in 1980.  By the 
year 2000, the size of this labour force had increased to 1460 million workers, 
mainly  through  population  growth  in  the  developing  countries  part  of  this 
group.   However, with the entry of India and China and the former Soviet bloc 
countries into the globalised economy, by the year 2000 the global labour force 
had doubled to 3 billion, of which nearly half, i.e. 1.47 billion were the Chinese, 
Indian and other new entrants to the labour force (see Graph 2).  This doubling 
of the labour force of the world’s integrating liberal capitalist economy Freeman 
suggests, has, on the whole, pleasant consequences for low income countries 
such as India and China, but potentially rather unpleasant outcomes for high 
wage workers in rich countries. 
 
Graph 2: The Great Doubling: critical lens for assessing what globalization 
does to labor 
 
Source: Freeman (2005) 
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Freeman  notes  that  these  additional  1.5  billion  workers  from  the  newly 
globalising countries had brought very little capital with them.  As a result, the 
global capital labour ratio was cut to 55 percent of its pre-2000 level.  This 
decline in the world capital labour ratio not only reduces average productivity 
but also makes capital scarce shifting the balance of power towards it. 
 
The  conventional  analysis  of  North-South  trade  involves  the  notion  that 
countries should produce according to their comparative advantage, with rich 
countries specializing in skill intensive or capital-intensive products and poor 
countries in labour-intensive and less skilled products.  Freeman regards this 
theory as obsolete in view of the outsourcing of many skill intensive jobs to the 
South and the ability of countries like India and China to produce more absolute 
numbers  of  engineers  and  science  graduates  than  the  US  In  2003,  China 
graduated 325,000 engineers and the US only 65,000.  Even taking into account 
the  technical  superiority  of  the  American  engineers  over  the  Chinese,  this 
difference is too large for US comfort. Freeman argues that the probability of 
achieving  technological  innovations  depends  on  the  absolute  numbers  of 
technically  trained  people  rather  than  their  relative  numbers.    The  reality 
according to Freeman is that the US is likely to lose its technological lead unless 
it takes extraordinary steps to reverse the present course of events.  In the hi-
tech sector, US pre-eminence is visibly under threat.  The US share of world 
exports of hi-tech manufacturers fell from 30 percent in 1980 to 17 percent in 
2000 and similarly its share of imports rose from 13 to 18 percent over the same 
period.  To sum up, Freeman is basically suggesting that industrial revolutions 
in China and India, represent gigantic supply-side shocks for many parts of the 
world economy, particularly the US These are likely to be extremely disruptive 
and harmful for these countries and regions not just in the short-run but also 
importantly in the long-term.   
 
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that Freeman does not advocate protection 
as a way out of these difficulties. Though non-protectionist, Freeman’s policy 
perspective is highly interventionist, and none the worse for that.  He calls for 
resolute and determined government intervention, at the national as well as at 
the  international  levels  to  manage  the  transition  during  which  the  new 
globalisers will catch up with the United States.  He expects this transition to be 
long and protracted – it may take as much as thirty to forty years.  His examples 
of good transition include West European catch-up after World War II; the bad 
transitions include southern American states’ integration after the civil war with 
the more industrialised north.  These also include the East German integration 
with  West  Germany  after  the  break-up  of  the  Berlin  Wall.  Freeman  argues 
against the current ‘Washington Consensus’ globalisation that, in his view, is 
biased towards protecting the interests of capital.  He writes eloquently: ‘The   6
international financial institutions may have to worry about instability of capital 
markets and crony corrupt capitalists, but they don’t have to worry about capital 
more  broadly:    George  Soros  and  his  billionaire  friends  can  take  care  of 
themselves.  It is the average worker in the world who needs the protection of 
the international community’ (Rocco C. and Marion S. Siciliano Forum 2005, 
pages not numbered). 
 
3.  Supply-Side Shocks and the Growth of Demand 
Professor  Freeman’s  apprehensions  about  the  impact  of  China’s  and  India’s 
integration on the North’s workers are well argued and supported by careful 
analysis and evidence. Like his 1995 article, this research represents a seminal 
contribution to the debate on this important subject. His arguments therefore 
require careful consideration. 
 
At a theoretical level Professor Freeman’s essential argument is that the supply 
side shock of doubling of the world’s labour force will have a profound impact 
on  labour  markets  in  other  countries.    The  size  of  the  shock  will  make  it 
disruptive. There is much in Freeman’s analysis we agree with, but there are 
also parts with which we have difficulties. For reasons of space and to add to 
the debate, it is the latter that we highlight below. 
 
Thus, one important shortcoming of Freeman’s analysis, in our view, is that it 
provides very little explicit consideration of demand side factors. In an early 
contribution, Singh (1977) suggested that foreign competition and the balance 
of  payments  position  of  an  economy  can  affect  its  growth  and  industrial 
development through three distinct but related channels:  (a) through the level 
and growth of demand; (b) through the structure of demand and (c) importantly, 
through investment.  In considering these channels, R.S. Sayers’s (1965) simple 
distinction between the complementary and competitive aspects of economic 
growth elsewhere is useful.  The central point of Sayers’s analysis is that ‘the 
expansion  of  the  world  economy,  although  it  may  raise  the  demand  for  a 
country’s  products,  also  creates  alternative  sources  of  supply,  which  may 
compete with them in any market, including its home market. So, from the point 
of view of a particular country, the development of the world economy may be 
characterised  by  a  changing  balance  between  ‘complementarity’  and 
‘competitiveness’.’ 
 
In  the  specific  case  of  the  integration  of  China  and  India  with  the  world 
economy, economic growth in these two countries is on the whole likely to be 
more complementary than competitive with the US economy and that of many 
other countries.  The essential point is that India and China, by virtue of their 
size  and  high  growth  rates  which  they  require  for  meeting  their  huge 
employment and other social needs, now constitute another growth pole for the   7
world economy.  Together, these two countries account for about 20 percent of 
world production and world demand.  Their demand side effects have already 
led to expansion in several countries, both developed and developing.  There is 
evidence  that  in  the  recent  period  China’s  trade  with  Japan  was  helpful  in 
preventing  the  Japanese  economy  from  going  into  recession.    As  Overholt 
(2005) notes,  
 
‘Chinese  demand  provided  the  stimulus  that  lifted  Japan  out  of 
recession  [during  the  slowdown  in  world  economic  growth 
following  the  collapse  of  the  technology  bubble  on  the  stock 
market].  It is difficult to overstate the risk the world economy faced 
from  the  Japanese  situation,  where  mountainous  debt  created  the 
risk of a domino-like collapse inside Japan and subsequent rippling 
collapses around the world.  That risk seems to have passed, helped 
by a critical margin of stimulus from China.   Few books are written 
about global depressions that never happened, but it is quite possible 
that China’s globalisation saved us from beginning the new century 
with a drastic global economic squeeze.’ 
 
Developing countries in general have benefited from the demand stimulus for 
raw materials and commodities provided by fast economic growth in China and 
India leading also to faster economic growth elsewhere.  Sustained growth in 
these  two  countries  thus  provides  a  stable  source  for  the  growth  of  world 
demand  in  general  with  favourable  effects  on  the  developing  as  well  as 
developed countries. 
 
The  aggregate and  sectoral demand effects of Chinese and Indian economic 
expansion manifest themselves in other ways too.  For example, the production 
of  cheap  goods  in  India  and  China,  particularly  in  the  latter,  helps  reduce 
inflationary pressures in advanced countries thereby allowing their economies 
to be run at higher levels of output and employment than they otherwise would.  
Unfortunately, there are few empirical studies which quantify the effects of this 
channel.    IMF  (2006)  has  recently  explored  the  question  of  the  effects  of 
globalisation on inflation.  These effects are estimated to be in general quite 
small – a reduction in inflation of the order of 0.25 percent, although estimates 
rise  to  1  percent  or  more  for  specific  years  and  specific  countries.    These 
studies,  however,  are  unable  to  measure  the  full  extent  of  the  effects  of 
globalisation on reducing the general level of prices, in large part because the 
real influence of globalisation is in this instance not directly quantifiable.   As 
Raghuram  Rajan  (2006)  notes:    ‘In  my  view,  however,  the  true  impact  of 
globalisation has been in contributing to wage and price restraint at a time when 
central  bankers  were  establishing  their  inflation-fighting  credibility,  thus   8
allowing them to achieve targets and gain credibility without the need to tighten 
to politically difficult levels’ (IMF (2006), p. xi). 
 
The  favourable  impact  of  Chinese  and  Indian  economic  growth  on  the  US 
economy  comes  also  through  other  related  channels.    For  example,  it  is 
estimated that lower prices for basic goods as a result of trade with China, India 
and other developing countries has contributed significantly to the standard of 
living of low-paid American citizens.  Preliminary estimates suggest that these 
lower prices help raise standards of living of poor Americans by about 5 to 10 
per cent.  Similarly, Chinese purchases of US Treasury bonds have helped to 
finance US budget deficits without which the US would have had higher interest 
rates and hence slower growth.  Although these may be regarded as short-term 
measures, they have nevertheless helped to keep up for several years the rate of 
growth of the US economy and hence of the world economy.   
 
There  are  undoubtedly  also  some  negative  effects  of  Chinese  and  Indian 
economic  growth  on  the  US  economy.    The  most  important  of  these  is  the 
competition from the two countries for the world’s scarce raw materials and 
commodities.  The enormous Chinese and Indian demand for these products, 
including  oil,  helps  raise  their  prices  and  thereby,  other  things  being  equal, 
disadvantage the US economy.  Even taking this negative factor into account, 
the overall balance of globalisation for the US economy is certainly likely to be 
favourable,  particularly  if  the  world’s  nation  states  adopt  in  the  future  a 
mutually  advantageous  cooperative  attitude  towards  issues  concerning 
environment and scarcity of raw materials.  
 
4.  Limitations of Previous Research 
The  above  considerations  do  not  show  adequately,  if  at  all,  in  the  three 
generations  (namely  those  covering  the  periods  1960-1980,  1980-2000  and 
2000-2005 respectively) of conventional studies of the impact of globalisation 
on US labour markets
3.  This is mainly because these are partial rather than 
general equilibrium studies.  There is very little research of the latter kind that is 
available.  There is, however, a recent contribution by Bailey and Lawrence 
(2006) that addresses this methodological problem to some extent.  The two 
authors examine changes in employment between 2000 and 2003 in the US 
economy, a period which has been marked by a relatively short recession.  The 
strong upturn following the recession did not however lead to much net job 
creation, and hence the emergence of ‘jobless growth.’  In the normal public 
discourse,  these  unfavourable  labour  market  outcomes,  are  blamed  on 
globalisation,  including  outsourcing  of  service  jobs  to  India.    The  authors 
carried out their empirical analysis on a detailed individual industry basis.  They 
use the following empirical model, as well as an input-output model of the US 
economy to address these questions.    9
 
  ei   =   wd  (d   -   v  )  +  wx   (x   -   v  ) -  wm   (m   -   v  )   
 
Where ei connotes percentage change in employment; wd, wx and wm are the 
weights  attached  to  domestic  use,  imports  and  exports  respectively.    This 
equation is an ex-post identity, in which ‘percentage change in employment is 
equal  to  the  weighted  average  of  the  percentage  changes  in  the  differences 
between the growth rate of labour productivity and value added due to domestic 
use,  value  added  due  to  exports,  and  value  added  attributable  to  imports’ 
(p.229). 
 
Using  this  framework,  the  authors  conclude  that  of  the  950,000  net 
manufacturing jobs lost by the year 2003, only 105,000 were due to trade and 
the remaining 845,000 to reduced growth of domestic demand (see Sichel 2004, 
p.279). 
 
Thus Baily and Lawrence’s paper suggests that the jobless growth in the US 
economy  in  the  first  half  of  this  decade  was  not  due  to  globalisation  as  is 
commonly believed, but to other factors.  It further indicates that imports from 
the Third World, including out-sourcing, had a negligible impact on US labour 
markets.    Much  the  greater  impact  of  globalisation  came  from  reduced  US 
exports to other countries that was mainly a result of the appreciation of the US 
dollar against other currencies.  The other main reason for the jobless growth 
and unfavourable labour market outcomes such as job instability arose from 
insufficient  expansion  of  aggregate  demand  in  the  US  economy.    Although 
Baily and Lawrence’s contribution represents a methodological advance over 
previous  studies,  even  this  does  not  yet  provide  a  fully  satisfactory  general 
equilibrium  model.  Baily  and  Lawrence  assume  that  the  rate  of  growth  of 
productivity is an exogenous variable, which many analysts would regard as 
being eminently endogenous. 
 
5.  Dynamism of U.S. Real Economy 
Although Professor Freeman has raised the right questions about the potential 
for  disruption  which  doubling  of  the  world  labour  force  raises,  he  perhaps 
under-estimates the capacity of the US economy to provide employment and 
adjustment to those who would lose their jobs as a result of competition.  As 
John Hicks suggests, although there is no guarantee that all those who have lost 
their jobs due to competition in the product markets will find jobs elsewhere, 
the probability is much higher that they will do so in a fast-growing, dynamic 
economy than in a stagnant, low-income economy.  The US, during the last ten 
years in particular, is precisely the former kind of economy.  
   10 
Professor Jorgensen and his colleagues (see for example Jorgensen et al., 2005) 
have  provided  information  on  growth,  productivity,  IT  services  and  other 
relevant  variables  for  G7  countries  on  a  comparable  basis.    This  body  of 
research,  which  includes  several  other  papers  by  the  authors  and  their 
collaborators,  is  the  most  authoritative  work  on  the  subject.  It  represents 
immense scholarship and exceptional application as it provides comparable data 
for  all  these  countries,  particularly  in  relation  to  the  input  and  output  of IT 
services, adjusted for quality changes.
4   The notable features of this research, 
which are relevant for this essay are given below. 
 
•  During the period 1995-2000, the US economy has been by far the fastest 
growing economy among G7 countries with a growth rate considerably 
higher than that of European countries as well as Japan.  The Japanese 
economy performed better than the US in terms of the growth of labour 
productivity over this period.  However, whereas hours worked arose by 
1.99 percentage points in the U.S., in Japan these fell by 0.79 percentage 
points.  Taking output and employment together, the U.S. performance 
was clearly the best of all G7 countries.  
•  In  addition,  there  is  general  agreement  that  the  U.S.  economy  has 
continued to perform strongly in the new millennium.  The figures for the 
period 2000-2005 indicate that the productivity growth rate accelerated 
further  and  the  country  recorded  during  this  period  the  highest 
productivity  growth  in  its  history.  Overall,  the  data  suggest  that  since 
1995 the U.S. economy has achieved a trend increase in its long-term 
historic  growth  rate  of  almost  one  percentage  point  per  annum.    This 
surge in productivity growth in part contributed to the U.S. phenomena of 
jobless  growth  in  the  early  parts  of  this  decade.  Jorgensen,  Ho  and 
Stiroh’s  suggest  that  the  1.57  percentage  points  difference  between 
productivity growth in the periods 1973-95 and 1995-2003 respectively 
was  about  half  due  to  an  increase  in  capital  per  person  including  IT 
technology (i.e., capital deepening) and half due to an increase in total 
factor  productivity.    In  view  of  the  aging  of  the  labour  force  the 
contribution  of  the  labour  input  to  productivity  growth  was  slightly 
negative. 
•  In short, the above data suggest that the U.S. has one of the most dynamic 
economies in the world.  The US dynamism is remarkable for the fact that 
it is not a catch-up economy but a frontier economy which has to do the 
hard work of discovering new knowledge in order to achieve sustained 
growth.  In these circumstances the significant recent trend increase in 
output and productivity growth rates over that of the last hundred years is 
quite extraordinary.  
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Professor Freeman raises two other issues that require comment in the light of 
the discussion above.  He is worried about the U.S. economy being able to 
retain its technological lead in view of the much larger number of science and 
engineering graduates in developing countries.  This apprehension also seems to 
be  somewhat  overdrawn.    It  is  indeed  true  that  India  and  China  have  large 
educated labour forces, but their capacity to innovate is hugely below that of the 
U.S.  This is because innovation does not just depend upon the ideas of science 
and engineering graduates, but also importantly on the scientific and technical 
infrastructure,  on  the  country’s  technical  culture,  and  on  organizational 
capabilities of firms.  In these respects, the U.S. is way ahead of India and 
China and will remain so for a long time.  Baumol (2002) has convincingly 
argued that the U.S. industrial structure of oligopolistic competition between 
giant firms is capitalism’s built-in innovating machine.  There is no reason to 
believe that this machine will become any less potent in the future.  However, it 
may  also  be  the  case  that  substantial  government  intervention  may  also  be 
required in this area to achieve the desired social goals.  The U.S. economic 
historian, William Lazonick (2008) suggests that the U.S. government is already 
providing assistance to corporations working in high-tech industries. 
 
Finally, Professor Freeman’s point about investment is critical.  However, the 
inherent dynamism of the U.S. economy suggests that it will continue to be an 
attractive place both for domestic and foreign companies.   
 
6.  Summing up: A Preliminary Assessment  
To sum up, previous sections have paid particular attention to the important 
work of Professor Freeman which suggests that even if trade with the Third 
World has not in the past seriously disadvantaged workers in the North, the 
doubling of the global labour force with the entry of India and China into the 
liberalised  global  economy  in  the  new  millennium  may  have  profoundly 
unfavourable  repercussions  for  workers  in  ACs.  The  above  analysis  has 
welcomed  Professor  Freeman’s  pioneering  and  original  contribution  to  this 
debate. It is broadly in sympathy with much of his analysis but it also contains a 
friendly  and  constructive  criticism  of  parts  of  the  Freeman  argument.    Two 
major  points  of  difference  with  Freeman  have  been  emphasized.  The  first 
concerns his inadequate attention to the demand side variables, which may in 
part address the supply side problems arising from the entry of India and China.  
Secondly  on  the  supply  side,  he  does  not  give  adequate  recognition  to  the 
dynamism  of  the  U.S.  real  economy,  its  entrepreneurship  and  highly 
competitive and innovative large corporations. The best corporations from all 
over the world including the U.S. itself will continue to wish to invest in the 
United States. Achieving a solid presence in the U.S. market remains a coveted 
prize for businesses everywhere.  
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Further as Jorgenson and Vu (2007) rightly observe:  
 
‘Differences in per capita output levels (between countries) are mainly due to 
input per capita rather than productivity. This reflects the fact that technology is 
relatively  easy  to  transfer  from  industrialized  economies  to  developing 
economies, while mobilization of capital and labor inputs requires much more 
time and considerably greater effort. Outmoded techniques of production must 
give way to newer methods that incorporate the latest technologies, especially 
those that utilize information technology equipment and software.’  
 
Hence  the  preliminary  assessment  of  the  present  paper  is  that  there  are 
significant  forces  at  work  both  on  the  demand  and  the  supply  sides  which 
indicate that notwithstanding the size of the two countries, the effects of China’s 
and India’s present industrial revolutions on advanced countries in the future 
can be accommodated just as well as those of Japan and Italy were in the past 
during their periods of rapid industrialization in the 1950’s and 1960’s (See 
further Singh, 2005; UNCTAD, 1995).  As elaborated in UNCTAD (1995) and 
Singh (2005), this accommodation occurred in the golden age, mainly because 
of faster OECD and world GDP growth. It will be recalled that between 1950 
and 1973 real wages of the U.S. workers rose at a rate of approximately 2% per 
annum.  
 
Thus although the analysis so far indicates that Professor Freeman has perhaps 
been unduly pessimistic about the prospects of the U.S. economy in response to 
Chinese and Indian industrial revolutions, he has nevertheless raised extremely 
important policy questions that deserve the attention of economists now and in 
the future. 
 
7.  Towards a Revised Conclusion 
The main reason why the above assessment should be regarded as preliminary is 
because it has not been checked so far against an empirical model of the world 
economy.  It  is  necessary  to  do  so  because  issues  involved  are  inherently 
complex  and  one  needs  to  be  sure  that  all  the  important  inter  relationships 
between variables are been properly taken into account.    
 
The model we used for checking whether our hypotheses and conjectures in 
previous sections are broadly accurate is described in Appendix 1. This is the 
CAM  world  model  which  draws  its  inspiration  from  an  earlier  Cambridge 
model associated with Francis Cripps and Wynne Godley. This model was very 
influential  in  the  UK  during  the  1970s  and  early  1980s
5.  It  is  essentially  a 
demand-driven model but is subject to some resource constraints. The results 
from two simulations of the model are reported below. The first one is based on 
the scenario that the current trends continue. The second scenario puts China   13 
and India as the main drivers of world economic growth. China is supposed to 
grow at a rate of 11% per annum (about the trends rate) and Indian economy is 
postulated to grow at 9% per annum (rate achieved during the last three years). 
The conclusions of the two simulations are reported in Appendix 2.  
 
The central point which emerges from the simulations is that the first scenario is 
totally non-sustainable as it leads to huge current account deficits for the U.S. 
economy and other unsustainable features. The second simulation suggests that 
the high growth rates in India and China will also run into resource constraints 
and are incompatible with growth rates of 3% per annum in G7 countries. This 
simulation does not lead to non-sustainability as it is assumed that India and 
China as well as other countries pursue a strong program of achieving energy 
efficiency and making the necessary investments for more efficient production 
of food and raw materials. Despite all these adjustments, the postulated high 
growth rates for India and China are only compatible with reduced G7 growth 
rates. Thus Freeman is right after all in that there is a conflict between the 
interest of the workers in the North and the South. This requires coordination 
and  cooperation  between  the  two  sides  and  as  Freeman  suggests  a  careful 
handling by the world community if global economic integration is to continue 
harmoniously.  
 
It will however be appreciated that fast economic growth in India and China is a 
social necessity because of the need to shift hundred of millions of people from 
farms to industry. In the Indian case there is an additional compulsion of that of 
providing  jobs for a labour force which is growing at 2% per annum. The rise 
of the Indian growth rate to nearly 9% per annum during the last three years is 
internally sustainable as it is based on a trend increase in the country’s saving 
and  investment  rates  from  about  25%  to  well  about  35%.  However  if  such 
growth  rates  are  not  compatible  with  the  desired  growth  rates  of  OECD 
countries this creates particular difficulties for India and China because of the 
social repercussions of insufficient job creation in these countries.  
 
It is also interesting to observe that in our pre-model analysis in sections 5 and 
6, at an aggregate level there did not appear to be a supply-side constraint for 
the world economy. The world economy has been growing at about 4% per 
annum  in  the  recent  period.  The  supply-side  potential  seemed  to  be  huge 
because  of  the  enormous  catch  up  possibilities  for  China,  India  and  other 
emerging countries. In addition, the world has available to it the revolutionary 
new  technology  of  ICT  which  most  countries  have  barely  begun  to  use. 
However  the  simulations  on  the  world  economic  model  show  that  at  a 
disaggregate level there are severe constraints on the supply-side which thwart 
the expansionary demand side effects of fast growth in China and India.  
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Notes
 
1  For  presentation  to  a  non-U.S.  audience,  Singh  (2007a)  wrote  as  follows. 
‘There  are  three  reasons  why  Professor  Freeman’s  contributions  have  been 
given special attention in this paper. First, he is a leading US labour economist 
who has done highly regarded research on this subject. He also evidently has 
sympathies with the trade unions and may be regarded as a bell weather for 
important sections of American intellectual opinion. Secondly, about ten years 
ago  Professor  Freeman  (1995)  had  written  a  seminal  article  with  the 
mischievous title “Are Your Wages Set in Beijing?”. He at that time argued that 
this was not the case and that there was insufficient integration between the US 
and Chinese labour markets to warrant the conclusion that it is the Chinese 
rather than the US labour market, which determines employment and wages for 
US  workers.    Professor  Freeman  today  is  more  likely  to  reach  an  opposite 
conclusion. Thirdly, his argument is looking more to the future that to the past, 
as explained in the text above.’ 
2 Many scholars would argue that two countries should have had their industrial 
revolutions  more  than  a  hundred  years  ago  but  they  were  thwarted  in  this 
endeavour by colonialism including unequal treaties. 
3 This issue is discussed at some length in Singh (2007) 
4  The  methodology  underlying  the  analysis  is  succinctly  summarised    in 
Jorgensen (2001) as follows:  ‘Under the assumption that product and factor 
markets are competitive, producer equilibrium implies that the share-weighted 
growth of outputs is the sum of the share-weighted growth of inputs and growth 
in total factor productivity: 
 
wI,n ∆ In In + wI,c ∆ In Ic + wI,s∆ In Is 
  + wI,t∆ In It + wC,n∆ In Cn 
  + wC,c∆ In Cc 
  =   vK,n∆ In Kn + vK,c∆ In Kc 
    + vK,s∆ In Ks + vK,t∆ In Kt 
    + vL∆ In L + ∆ In A 
where w and v denote average value shares. The shares of outputs and inputs 
add to one under the additional assumption of constant returns, 
 
wI,n + wI,c + wI,s + wI,t + wC,n + wC,c = vK,n + vK,c + vK,s + vK,t + vL = 1.’ 
 
5 This is the so called Cambridge Economic Policy Group (CEPG) model.    15 
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Appendix  1:    The  CAM:  Cambridge-Alphametrics  Model  of  the  world 
economy 
 
World economy databank 
The  databank  is  constructed  from  observations  reported  by  more  than  200 
countries and it is made possible thanks to the collaboration of UN/DESA and 
the UNDS who provide the raw data. Complementary data is obtained from 
databases of other multilateral organizations, like the WB and the IMF, and 
national statistical offices. 
 
SoWE  researchers  at  Alphametrics  (Saraburi,  Thailand)  update  a  world 
databank  at  least  twice  a  year.  Original  observations  are  recombined  and 
supplemented by estimates to deal with boundary changes and fill gaps in the 
historical  record.  They  are  then  further  adjusted  to  reconcile  totals  obtained 
from  different  sources  and  enforce  adding-up  constraints  for  the  world  as  a 
whole. Adjustments are made using an algorithm that minimizes changes to the 
original data. The algorithm is a creation of Alphametrics Co., Ltd. and is based 
on  standard  statistical  methods  for  large  systems.
6  Each  observation  in  the 
databank records the original and final (adjusted) value with a source reference 
and quality indicator. 
 
The  data  set  in  its  final  form  is  provided  in  an  excel  worksheet  with  an 
embedded VBA programme that extracts from the SQL databank. The databank 
provides  over  840,000  observations  on  trade,  balance  of  payments,  income, 
expenditure,  population  and  energy  production  and  use.  These  data  may  be 
extracted as annual time series covering the period since 1970 for the world 
divided into 127 countries and country groups (‘flexible geometry’). 
 
There are a number of pre-determined country groups, such as: 
 
A ‘standard’ disaggregation (12 blocs): U.S., Japan, Western Europe, Other 
Developed, Eastern Europe, Former USRR, Middle East, China, India, Other 
developing Asia, Developing America and Africa. 
 
‘Income’  disaggregation  (12  blocs):  dividing  the  world  into  three  broad 
geographical regions with high-income, low-to-middle income and low-income 
country groups. The USA, China and India are distinguished individually. 
 
‘Energy’ variants: propose groups in five geographical regions, distinguishing 
exporters  and  importers.  The  USA,  China  and  India  are  distinguished 
individually. The disaggregation proposed under the name ‘UNLIC’, presented   18 
at  the  EEA  conference  2008,  takes  the  UN  classification  of  world  regions, 
further subdivided into high, middle and low income groups thus allowing to 
focus on the situation of ‘Low income countries’ (LICs): 
 
 
bloc  % 
pop 
cum%  %2006 
income 
cum % 
United States  US  5%    27%   
Japan  JA  2%    9%   
EU-15  EUH  6%    28%   
Other Europe: High 
Inc 
EOH  1%    3%   
Other Developed  OD
H 
1%  15%  5%  72% 




1%    1%   
CIS (former USSR)  CIM  4%    3%   
China & HK  CN  20%    6%   




8%    5%   
West Asia  WA
M 
3%    3%   
Latam Mid- Inc  AM
M 
7%    6%   
Africa Mid-Inc  AF
M 
3%  46%  1%  24% 
South Asia  SAL  24%    3%   
D'ng  Asia:  Mid-
Income 
ASL  3%    0%   
Latam Low- Inc  AM
L 
1%    0%   
Africa Low-Inc  AFL  11%  39%  1%  4% 
 
 
World economy model, baseline and scenarios 
The model runs on EViews programming that can be altered to revise baseline 
projections and simulate alternative scenarios and even create model variants 
using different geographical disaggregations. The programs load historical data 
and generate series  for model variables, run econometric  estimations, define 
model equations and generate a baseline projection and policy simulations. 
   19 
The initial step is to create the historic stock-flow dataset that is consistent with 
national accounts and world aggregation rules. 
 
Further,  inequality  measures  are  calculated  to  monitor  changes  in  the 
dispersion  of  average  per  capita  values  between  blocs.  A  Gini  index  GY  is 
calculated for income per capita; Theil indexes are calculated for a wider set of 
variables including income Y, expenditure H, energy use and energy supply ED 
and EP, and exports of manufactures and services XM and XS. These inequality 
measures are embedded into the model solution so that each projection provides 
the variations in inequality over the future.
7 
 
The  typical  way  to  construct  the  baseline  is  to  project  implications  of  a 
continuation of current trends and policies into the future. 
 
Alternative scenarios explore the potential requirements and consequences of 
policy changes. Scenarios may be defined by setting targets for a number of 
endogenous variables (outcomes), implying modification of the future path of a 
corresponding  number  of  exogenous  variables  or  structural  relationships 
(instruments).  Combinations  of  targets  and  instruments  must  be  chosen 
carefully with consideration of mutual compatibility and timescales. Scenarios 




The  model  is  anchored  in  a  consistent  stock-flow  framework  by  the 
application of a strict accounting principles and the use of algorithms to make 
that identities hold in each run. 
 
The  structural  relations  that  drive  adjustments  are  estimated  and  fitted 
according the following principles: 
 
• The same structural forms are used for all blocs to facilitate use of the model 
with different lists of blocs. 
•  Structural  relations  are  estimated  econometrically  under  a  variety  of 
specification models and geographical aggregations in panel data (including a 
time series – cross section panel for the 127 countries!). After revising results 
and studying properties and confronting with historic evidence beyond the raw 
economic  data  (e.g.  institutions,  history,  etc)  final  values  are  decided  to 
construct ‘pseudo-inexact’ relations depending on the stochastic properties of 
the residuals and trends.   20 
• Consistency of historical data with structural relationships is examined using 
normalized  series.  Typically  a  first  difference  form  is  estimated  for  the 
historical period and continuation of the same residual behaviour is assumed in 
the baseline projection. 
• The historical pattern of residuals is examined to check plausibility of data and 
structural relationships. In cases where trends change significantly for reasons 
that  are  reasonably  well  understood  but  not  captured  by  the  model  (eg 
demography or energy supply) baseline forecasts may be modified by inclusion 
of add factors. 
• Values of structural coefficients are imposed and should not be revised unless 
there is good reason or evidence for the change. Prima facie the same structural 
coefficients (elasticities and lags) are applied for all blocs. 
• Fine tuning of structural forms and coefficients may be misleading and thus is 
not recommended. Simulation properties should not depend too much on the 
point  in  time  at  which  simulations  are  calculated  or  the  geographical 
disaggregations used. 
• Add factors may also be used to model the present - ie adjust predictions for 
the last or current year in the light of known developments that are not reflected 
in the databank. 
• These same add factors are used to simulate policy scenarios by imputing 
known  (established  by  econometric  or  circumstantial  evidence)  or  assumed 
policy effects. 
 
Overview of main structural equations in the CAM 
Population 
Population N is extrapolated using a difference equation 
dlog(N) = c + u 
 
Real exchange rate 
The real exchange rate for each bloc is an index of the ratio of the price of 
domestic  expenditure  to  the  price  of  world  exports  of  manufactures.  It  is 
assumed  that  the  real  exchange  rate  is  influenced  by  the  current  account 
position;  if  a  country  has  a  strong  current  account  the  real  exchange  rate 
appreciates more rapidly. The equation for each bloc written in difference form 
is 
 
dlog(RX) = c + RX_add - 0.10 log(RX(-1))+ 0.25 log(1+CA(-1)/(RX(-1)*Y(-1))) 
+ u 
 
where RX_add is an instrument that may be used to push the real exchange rate 
for the bloc in one direction or another (eg in reponse to policy).   21 
 
Predicted  real  exchange  rates  for  all  blocs,  RX,  are  scaled  up  or  down  to 
maintain a constant ratio of the price of exports of manufactures to the price of 
domestic expenditure for the world as a whole. 
 
Primary commodities 
World markets for primary commodities are driven by price, more particularly 
the terms of trade between primary commodities and manufactures. When the 
terms of trade move in favour of primary commodities we can expect faster 
growth  of  supply  and  greater  efficiency  in  use,  reducing  growth  of  demand 
relative to income. When the terms of trade move against primary commodities 
market pressures work in the opposite direction. The influence of changes in the 
terms of trade takes time to come through since responses require organizational 
changes and investment in R&D, infrastructure and production facilities. 
 
For the purposes of the CAM model the average lag in response of production 
and demand to changes in world prices is assumed to be around 3 years. The 
model defines lagged price variables PALS and PELS in log form as 
 
PALS = 0.3 log(PA) + 0.7 PALS(-1) 
PELS = 0.3 log(PE) + 0.7 PELS(-1) 
 
where PA and PE are terms of trade indexes for food and raw materials and 
energy products respectively. 
 
A lagged real exchange rate variable RXLS_{%b} calculated with the same lag 
is used to convert world terms of trade indexes to a domestic price basis for 
each bloc. 
 
Although  prices  in  the  world  market  are  important,  production  of  primary 
commodities  in  each  country  or  region  (bloc)  also  depends  on  growth  of 
domestic demand, whether because of product differentiation, transport costs, 
subsidies or other forms of protection. To capture the influence of domestic 
demand  on  production,  the  CAM  model  defines  assumed  components  of 
production for the domestic market, AH and EH, that are insensitive to world 
prices. These components are imputed as follows: 
 
AH = AP AD / (AP3 + AD3)1/3 
EH = EP ED / (EP3 + ED3)1/3 
   22 
where AP, EP and AD, ED measure production and domestic use of food and 
raw materials and energy products respectively. 
 
The value of these functions approaches 80% of domestic demand or production 
when production equals domestic demand. 
 
Demand for food and raw materials AD in each bloc is assumed to follow an 
Engel curve of the form 
 
AD = 150 N + 0.5 Y exp(-0.3(PALS-RXLS)) 
 
while  demand  for  energy  is  given  by  an  equation  for  changes  in  energy 
efficiency: 
 
dlog(ED/Y) = c - 0.05 d(PELS-RXLS + log(1+ED_tax)) + u 
 
where N is population and Y is income. The symbol c denotes a bloc-specific 
intercept (rate of energy saving) and u is a stochastic residual. The variable 
ED_tax is used in scenarios to simulate ‘green tax’ measures or carbon credits 
that restrict energy use and emissions. 
 
Changes in production depend on domestic demand and world prices as well as 
other bloc-specific factors represented by intercepts c and stochastic terms u: 
 
dlog(AP-AP_add-0.7*AH(-1)*AD/AD(-1))-0.1*d(PALS-RXLS) = c + u 
dlog(EP-EP_add-0.7*EH(-1)*ED/ED(-1))-0.1*d(PELS-RXLS) = c + u 
 
The add factors AP_add and EP_add could be modified in baseline projections 
and scenarios to incorporate variant assumptions about future supply trends in 
each bloc. 
 
The terms of trade PA and PE are adjusted to balance supply and demand for 
the world as a whole 
 
AP = AD and EP = ED 
 
The adjustment is implemented at each iteration of a model solution using the 
following formulae: 
 
PA = PA (AD / AP).8 
PE = PE (ED / EP).8   23 
The terms of trade for each commodity group are instantly adjusted up or down 
by 8% for each 1% shortfall or excess in global supply relative to demand. 
 
Trade balances for primary commodities 
In  the  case  of  food  and  raw  materials,  series  representing  demand  and 
production have been defined to satisfy a simple trade balance identity for each 
bloc: 
 
BA = PA (AP - AD) 
 
where  BA  is  the  trade  balance  measured  in  terms  of purchasing  power  (for 
exports of manufactures), PA is the terms of trade and AP-AD represents net 
exports or imports measured in constant dollar terms. 
 
In  the  case  of  energy  products  the  trade  balance  measured  in  value  terms 
(purchasing power for exports of manufactures) is compared with the physical 
balance 
 
EB = EP-ED 
 
which is measured in million tons of oil equivalent and the real price of oil. 
 
The relationship is written as a difference equation: 
 
BE - BE(-1) = 140 * (PE EB - PE(-1) EB(-1)) 
 
The coefficient (140) represents the average base-year price of traded energy 
products in dollars per ton of oil equivalent. To ensure that the value balance for 
the world as a whole will sum to zero when the physical balance sums to zero, 
no intercept or residual autocorrelation has been estimated. 
 
Trade in manufactures 
Imports of manufactures MM are assumed to change progressively as a ratio to 
domestic  spending H and exports of manufactures XM, the latter having an 
import content two-and-a-half times as high as the former: 
 
dlog(MM/(H + 2.5 XM)) = c + 0.8 dlog(RX) - 0.2 d(dlog(H + 2.5 XM)) + u 
 
The equation includes a real exchange rate term with an elasticity of 0.8; thus a 
higher real exchange rate implies an increase in the value of imports in foreign 
currency terms and a small reduction in terms of domestic purchasing parity.   24 
 
Exports of manufactures depend on the exporting bloc's market share SMp in 
imports MMp by each partner bloc: 
 
XM = sum (SMp.MMp) 
 
Market  shares  depend  on  exchange  rate  movements  and  ongoing  structural 
shifts: 
 
dlog(SMp) = c + SM_add + 0.2 dlog(RX) - 0.5 d(RXLS(-1)) + u 
 
There is an adverse first-year effect of devaluation which is reversed in the 
following years provided the real exchange rate advantage is maintained. Shares 
calculated by the above formula are scaled to sum to unity.
8 
 
The trade balance is the difference between exports and imports: 
 
BM = XM - MM 
 
Services 
Imports of services are assumed to depend on the real exchange rate, domestic 
demand and imports of manufactures (the latter being heavily weighted): 
 
dlog(MS) = c + 0.6 dlog(RX) + 0.9 dlog(H+5.0*MM) + u 
 
Exports of services are predicted on the basis of world imports MSw and own 
imports of services. 
 
dlog(XSU) = c + 0.7 dlog(MSw) + 0.5 dlog(MS) + u 
 
Results for each bloc are scaled to sum to world imports. 
 
External income and transfers 
The balance on income and transfers is assumed to change in response to the 
prior-year  current  account  (net  lending  or  borrowing)  and  exchange  rate 
movements  (devaluation  being  favourable  for  a  country  with  a  deficit  on 
income and transfers): 
 
d(BI) = c + 0.025 CA(-1) + 0.5 BI(-1) d(RX_?)/RX(-1) + u 
   25 




The model is completed by specifying the adjustment of domestic expenditure 
H in each bloc as a function of income Y. The balance of payments on current 
account CA has been introduced as an additional influence on domestic credit 
expansion whose weight depends on a country's relative per capita income level 
YR. Thus the balance of payments is assumed to exert a significant influence on 
demand  policy  in  low-income  countries  but  little  influence  in  high-income 
countries. An intercept term allows different blocs to have a stronger or weaker 





The global closure of the model 
The  balance  of  payments  on  current  account  is  the  sum  of  balances  on 
merchandise  trade,  services  and  income  and  transfers  and  its  closure 
encompasses the adjustment of structural relations at the ‘domestic’ level of 
each bloc: 
 
CA = BA + BE + BM + BS + BI 
 
Income Y is the sum of domestic expenditure and the current account measured 
in PPP units: 
 
Y = H + CA/RX 
 
The model is demand-determined and does not have economy-wide constraints 
on expansion of GDP. Supply constraints in individual sectors (food and raw 
materials, energy and manufacturing) influence aggregate demand and income 
through their impact on the trade balance. 
 
Overview of Policy Scenarios 
Scenarios  are  projections  that  make  different  assumptions  about  specific 
variables as a basis for a new solution of the model as a whole. In some cases, 
policy measures and their effects are imputed in the existing relations. It is not 
expected  that  a  global  model  will  have  explicit  variables  and  behavioural 
specifications for each imaginable policy initiative. 
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‘Target-instrument’  scenarios  posit  a  policy  objective  (target),  like  an 
accelerated reduction in the US current account deficit from certain point in 
time onwards and proposes changes in a policy stance or condition (instrument), 
like imputed changes in US domestic demand emulating fiscal tightening or 
credit restraints, that could help achieving the objective. 
 
Another type of scenario is one in which ‘add factors’ are changed one at a time 
to explore how such changes affect the results. This kind of scenario shows the 
'sensitivity'  of  the  model  to  changes  and  can  be  used  to  make  ‘trial-error’ 
experiments in policy-making. 
 
Some of the scenarios that are usually proposed in the CAM are: 
 
How to reduce the US current account deficit 
Either by ‘target-instrument’ or ‘trial-error’, CAD reduction can in principle be 
achieved  by  means  of  (i)  deflation  in  the  US,  (ii)  adjustments  to  the  real 
exchange rate, or (iii) domestic expansion in surplus blocs. Generally, realistic 
scenarios  result  from  a  combination  of  some  of  these  alternatives,  but  the 
specific configuration remains arbitrary. 
 
The implied trade-offs are obvious: deflation in the US is recessionary both for 
the US and the rest of the world; drastic or lasting changes in the exchange rate 
may  disrupt  financial  markets,  asset  prices,  real  balances  and  portfolio 
allocations  in  generally  unknown  ways;  rest  of  the  world  reflation  requires 
coordination  and  if  it  is  achieved  by  a  global  demand  push  is  leads  to 
excessively high prices of commodities and energy (i.e. it reaches environment 
constraints). 
 
How to stabilize global energy use and reduce emissions 
The obvious mechanisms are (i) global growth slowdown, and (ii) green taxes. 
To achieve energy reduction, say to allow energy use to growth at ‘no-more’ 
than the average of last two decades, requires a severe recession with declining 
per  capita  income  in  most  blocs.  The  price  of  oil  declines  in  real  terms, 
removing  any  price  incentive  for  increased  efficiency  of  energy  use  or 
substitution of clean sources in place of carbon-based fuels. Meanwhile, a tax 
on energy use (by raising an ‘add factor’ that has been named ED_tax), can be 
used to push up the user price of energy as necessary to prevent increases in 
global energy use. The producer price of energy declines in real terms at the 
same rate as in a reduction by global slowdown, but the user price increases 
substantially on account of the tax. In this way there would not be impact on 
global income (as compared with the base scenario), but there is an implied   27 
redistribution of (trade) income from energy exporters to energy importers due 
to the reduction in the producer price. 
 
The model does not yet provide for redistribution of revenue generated by the 
‘carbon  tax’,  but  it  can  be  thought  to  add  to,  say  a  ‘liquidity  provision 
mechanism’ to sustain either economic development in general or investment in 
energy efficiency. 
 
How to obtain sustained income growth in low and middle income blocs 
There  are  various  alternatives.  This  could  be  achieved  by  domestic  demand 
expansion  (say  a  positive  fiscal  or  credit  stimulus)  in  low  and  mid-income 
countries.  The  combined  impact  is  a  boost  to  world  markets.  This  scenario 
implies accelerated growth in high income countries and a smaller reduction in 
inequality indexes. Energy use increases faster and the price of oil rises more 
rapidly than in the baseline. 
 
Another  way  is  by  calibrated  ‘  ex-ante’  real  exchange  rate  depreciation  in 
relevant  blocs.  Whether  and  how  such  a  movement  can  be  engineered  by 
government  and  monetary  authorities  is  debatable  and  by  wage  repression 
should  be  discarded.  It  is  more  likely  that  this  can  result  from  productivity 
increases  due  to  improve  production  techniques,  infrastructure  and  large 
economies of scale (see below). Supposing that such a trend can be achieved 
without social costs, the result of this scenario is faster growth in the blocs 
concerned  and  slightly  slower  growth  in  other  blocs  with  some  increase  in 
global  income  and  a  small  reduction  in  oil  prices  relative  to  the  baseline. 
Inequality indexes for income, expenditure and energy supply and use improve 
faster than in the base scenario. Low income blocs would be moving up towards 
the world average. There are problems about the sustainability of this scenario, 
particularly if is it is not supported by sustained productivity increases. Firstly 
the trend is normally for the real exchange rate to appreciate in blocs where per 
capita income grows faster. If real exchange rates were to start moving in a 
more normal direction again it is logical to ask whether convergence will be 
halted or reversed. Another issue is the likelihood that real depreciation will 
aggravate income inequality within low-income countries. 
 
An alternative would be a combination of the above with a strong emphasis on 
industrial policy,  intra-regional  trade  (or  better:  South-South)  trade  aimed  at 
increasing  export  manufacturing  shares,  and  regulation  aimed  at  checking 
excessive asset and debt dislocations. 
 
Further on combined scenarios and international policy co-ordination   28 
Experiments with the model are instructive and can as well serve to inform 
about  concrete  policy  recipes.  But  to  secure  success  to  resolve  problems  of 
global scope two things need to be considered: well calibrated but parsimonious 
mixes of policy instruments to take care of trade-offs and policy reactions, and 
to  coordinate  policy  worldwide.  The  CAM  could  serve  as  a  tool  for  policy 
coordination exercises in so far as it advances in incorporating constraints and 
features that are critical for adjustment in the various world regions. 
 
A1. Model variables 
AD   million $, 2000 IPP   Demand for food and raw materials 
AP   million $, 2000 IPP   Production of food and raw materials 
AH   million $, 2000 IPP   Domestic deliveries of food and raw materials 
BA   million $, 2000 IPP   Trade balance in food and raw materials 
BE   million $, 2000 IPP   Trade balance in energy products 
BI   million $, 2000 IPP   Balance on external income and transfers 
BM   million $, 2000 IPP   Trade balance in manufactures 
BS   million $, 2000 IPP   Balance on services 
CA   million $, 2000 IPP   Balance on current account 
EB   million tons of oil equivalent Net exports of primary energy 
ED   million tons of oil equivalent Primary energy use 
EH   million tons of oil equivalent Domestic deliveries of energy products 
EP   million tons of oil equivalent Primary energy production 
H   million $, 2000 PPP Domestic expenditure on goods and services 
MM   million $, 2000 IPP Imports of manufacturesX 
MS   million $, 2000 IPP Imports of servicesX 
N   millions Population 
PA   2000 = 1 Terms of trade for exports of food and raw materials 
PALS   Log weighted lag value of terms of trade for exports of food and 
raw materials 
PE   2000 = 1 Terms of trade for exports of energy products 
PELS   log  weighted  lag  value  of  terms  of  trade  for  exports  of  energy 
products 
PAL  2000 PA = 1 Lagged terms of trade for food and raw materials 
PEL   2000 PE = 1 Lagged terms of trade for energy exports 
RX   Real exchange rate ratio (of domestic prices to W. price of manufactures) 
RXLS   log weighted lag value of real exchange rate 
SM   ratio Share of exports of manufactures of each bloc in the import market 
of 
each partner bloc 
XM   million $, 2000 IPP Exports of manufactures 
XS   million $, 2000 IPP Exports of services   29 
Y   million $, 2000 PPP Disposable income 
YR   index, world avg = 1 in each year Relative per capita income (PPP) 
 
Ratios and inequality measures: 
CAY  per cent   Current account as per cent of income 
Dxx   per cent   per year Growth rates of income Y, population N, per capita 
income YN, exports of manufactures M, exports of services XS, production 
of good and raw materials AP, energy production EP 
GY,   range 0 to 100 Gini coefficient for per capita income 
LYR  log Relative per capita income (log scale) 
MMY   Imports of manufactures as per cent of income 
Txx,   range 0 to 100 Theil inequality measures (comparing blocs) for income 
Y, 
domestic expenditure H, energy use ED, energy production EP, exports of 
manufactures XM and exports of services XS 
RX   ratio Real exchange rate (ratio of domestic prices to world price of 
manufactures for the world as a whole) 
RXL  ratio Lagged real exchange rate 
XMM   Exports of manufactures as per cent of imports of manufactures 
XMS  per cent Exports of manufactures as per cent of world total 
YN $  2000 PPP Per capita income 
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Appendix 2 
 
The relevant features of this empirical exercise are the following: 
 
a)  without  policy  intervention  and  international  coordination,  the  current 
patterns point to a continuation of global imbalances in which astronomic 
current  account  deficits  in  the  US  will  be  matched  by  rapidly  rising 
surpluses in other developed regions and main oil exporters. Exporters in 
primary  commodities  (like  the  Latin  American  region)  will  show 
surpluses as well (while China’s surplus will start to decline as pressure 
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b) These  patterns  are  untenable,  firstly  for  reasons  that  have  started  to 
emerge in the current global financial turmoil: credit driven excesses of 
spending over income leads to the accumulation of unsustainable debts 
and  thus  are  prone  to  crises.  Secondly,  the  pressure  on  resources, 
particularly on energy but on primary products as well, is so great that, 
under  current  production  and  utilization  patterns  prices  will  surely 
escalate. If patterns of this kind are confirmed with time, this will have 
severe terms of trade and inflation implications for all. Most importantly 
perhaps,  the  rapid  rising  of  such  prices  relative  to  the  price  of   31 
manufactures  will  actually  work  as  a  disincentive  for  countries  in  the 
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c)  the thesis proposed in this paper is that industrialization in the developing 
world  is  essential  to  the  progress  of  these  nations  and  that  moreover 
efforts to industrialize can be coordinated in order to help resolving the 
problems  posed  above  regarding  global  macroeconomic  balances  and 
pressure  on  global  resources.  A  coordinated  solution  will  seek 
complementary, rather than substitution, among industrializing nations, 
by  which  more  advanced  economies  could  concentrate  on  energy  and 
input-saving  production  techniques  that  require  greater  capital 
accumulation and research costs. Meanwhile, all countries will strengthen 
efforts  towards  increasing  production  in  primary  resources  and  food, 
which in developing countries is more challenging because it requires 
significant  and  sustained  investments  in  infrastructure.  This  is  most 
important  because  the  industrialization  in  developing  nations  and  the 
expected growth convergence are likely going to imply unprecedented 
rises in the demand for food and raw materials. Likewise, there should be 
an effective mechanism to develop new techniques to save energy as well 
as investing in alternative sources.    32 
d) For  such  a  coordinated  solution  to  kick  start  and  avoid  further 
reverberations of a drastic unwinding of global imbalances and a free fall 
of  the  dollar,  the  US  economy  will  have  to  experience  a  noticeable 
adjustment of a ‘soft-landing’ kind, which is likely going to result from a 
combined slow down of domestic demand and a controlled devaluation. 
Eventually  the  latter  will  play  the  role  of  shifting  market  shares 
particularly among developed nations but because of the combined efforts 
in other industries than manufactures and the success in avoiding sky-
rising prices of inputs and energy, all developed nations will eventually 
manage to grow around trend. 
 
e)  While at the same time assure that in the without policy intervention and 
international coordination, the current patterns point to a continuation of 
global imbalances in which astronomic current account deficits in the US 
will be matched by rapidly rising surpluses in other developed regions 
and main oil exporters. Exporters in primary commodities (like the Latin 
American region) will show surpluses as well (while China’s surplus will 
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Simulation of Scenario 2 
The purpose of this exercise is to illustrate the scope and limits of a scenario for 
the world economy with the following characteristics: 
￿  The main drivers of global growth are India (IN) and China (CN) 
￿  These blocs industrialize at a fast pace: CN follows the pattern consolidated 
over  the  last  decade,  while  IN  accelerates  its  industrialization  drive. 
Together with a rapid increase of domestic demand, the impetus of exports 
of manufactures allow for growth rates of 9% in IN and 11% in CN. 
￿  Because  such  patterns  put  a  tremendous  pressure  on  resources,  these 
countries  in  particular  are  assumed  to  stress  policies  on  energy  and 
commodities.  On  commodities  (raw  materials  and  food)  they  have  to 
accelerate  production  as  well  as  efficiency  of  use.  On  energy,  the  main 
effort  by  both  countries  is  on  efficiency  use,  but  CN  will  accelerate 
production as well. 
￿  The rest of the world also contributes to alleviate pressure on resources, 
mainly by efficiency of use. 
￿  The United States (US) experiences an adjustment in the direction of slowly 
reducing its current account deficit. 
￿  Yet, the US and other developed regions (Japan, JA, and other developed 
included Europe, ED) will not be affected by a significantly slower growth 
(their growth rates will be around 2.5%). The initial adjustment in the US 
results  from  a  combination  of  reduced  domestic  absorption  and  real 
exchange rate depreciation. Such a depreciation turns out to be against all 
regions, with the other developed blocs absorbing the most of the it. It is the 
exchange rate appreciation of developed regions which drives the relatively 
moderate  growth  performance  in  those  regions  and  NOT  the 
industrialization of IN and CN. 
￿  The scenario improves all measures of distribution (income, manufacturing, 
etc.) 
This scenario is posed as an alternative to the constructed ‘baseline’ which is a 
non-sustainable solution. The problems of such baseline are many, of which:  
o  Global  imbalances  will  continue  to  grow  indefintively,  with  all  the 
consequences that it carries. 
o  The pressure on resources (energy and commodities) is exorbitant, which is 
manifested in ever rising prices of energy and commodities (food and raw 
materials).   34 
o  Under  this  baseline  scenario  there  is  hardly  scope  for  countries  in  the 
developing  world  to  develop  by  industrialization  and  the  only  source  of 
success is the specialization in exports of raw materials and energy. 
 
A series of plots comparing both scenarios are available from the authors. They 
are not included here for reasons of space. 
 
The world is grouped into the following 12 blocs/countries: 1US, 2 JA, 3 ED: 
Europe  &  other  developed,  4  IN,  5  CN,  6  UR:  former  USSR,  7  BMA: 
Brazil+Mexico+Argentina,  8  WA:  West  Asia,  9  AM:Other  Middle  income 




6 See, for example, Nicolardi V. ‘Balancing Large Accounting Systems: An 
Application to the 1992 Italian I-O Table’ 
7 The Gini index is computed as 
GY = 100 (1 - sum( n (s + s(-1))) 
where  the  sum  is  taken  over  blocs  ranked  in  ascending  order  of  per  capita 
income, n is the share of each 
bloc in world population and s is the cumulative share of world income. 
The Theil index is computed as 
T = 100 (1 - exp( - sum(s ln (xn / XN))) 
where s is the share of each bloc in world income or any other variable of 
interest, xn is the per capita 
value in each bloc and XN is the per capita value in the world as a whole. 
8 The final result is equivalent to that of a CES or ‘Armington’ model. 
 